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UNCITRAL TRANSPARENCY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 2014 INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION TRANSPARENCY RULES AND THEIR EFFECT ON INVESTOR-STATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES AND ECONOMIC FAIRNESS 
By 
Kayla Kelly-Slatten1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In 2002, Pacific Rim Mining Corporation (now owned by OceanaGold) began 
exploring gold mining in the Central American country El Salvador.2 Six years later, due 
to extreme public outcry regarding the polluted and depleted drinking water, Salvadoran 
President Elías Antonio Saca banned mineral mining, and denied all permits, including 
Pacific Rim’s.3 Pacific Rim initiated an international arbitration proceeding in 2009 under 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rules, stating that 
because of Pacific Rim’s investment in the State, El Salvador was bound to issue Pacific 
Rim a mining permit.4 Although this seems hardly ground-breaking, large corporations 
like Pacific Rim often subject developing nations to arbitrate issues arising from 
unsatisfied demands of the investors.5 
 The central issue in investor-state arbitration is not the submission to arbitrate,6 
but the actual arbitral proceedings. Traditional arbitration is known for being private and 
secret, away from the media and public scrutiny. This lack of transparency can hurt 
developing States’ abilities to make public policy decisions, enforce regulations, and 
efficiently use their limited amounts of resources.7 Particularly, a lack of transparency 
                                                
1 Kayla Kelly-Slatten is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 
2017 Juris Doctor Candidate at the Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. 
2 Lauren Carasik, Undermined – The Case Against International Arbitration Tribunals, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2014-10-01/undermined. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 Amy Westervelt, Lawsuit Against El Salvador Mining Ban Highlights Free Trade Pitfalls, THE 
GUARDIAN SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS (May 27, 2015, 13:16 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/may/27/pacific-rim-lawsuit-el-salvador-
mine-gold-free-trade. 
6 But see Ciara Nugent, El Salvador vs Pacific Rim: The Price of Saying ‘No’ to a Gold Mine, THE 
ARGENTINA INDEPENDENT, (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/analysis/el-salvador-vs-pacific-rim-the-price-
of-saying-no-to-a-gold-mine/. “The threats to water access, the negative effects of mining activity 
on the environment, and the will of the Salvadoran public, are therefore effectively excluded from 
the ICSID’s deliberation. Faced with a process that is both opaque and seemingly independent of 
environmental concerns, the likelihood that anti-mining activists…can have an impact on the 
case’s outcome may seem minimal.” 
7 See Mihaela Papa, Emerging Powers in International Dispute Settlement: From Legal Capacity 
Building to a Level Playing Field?, J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 83-109 (2013). See also Thomas 
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during investor-state arbitration hinders fair adjudication on public policy concerns, such 
as environmental and economic issues. Recognizing these complications, the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a set of 
transparency rules (the Rules) in 2014 to encourage more open and public-friendly 
arbitration settings.8 
 This Article will examine the effects of the UNCITRAL transparency rules on 
global environmental issues submitted to international arbitration. Part II will briefly 
analyze the Rules facially, looking at their general scope and the mechanisms for 
ensuring transparent adjudication. Part III will then examine how the Rules can benefit 
the public through environmental transparency if applied appropriately. Lastly, Part IV 
will analyze how the Rules can promote fair economic play between industrialized 
nations’ investors and developing communities from an environmental standpoint. 
II.  A FACIAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNCITRAL TRANSPARENCY RULES 
 UNCITRAL is not the first alternative dispute resolution forum to enact 
transparency rules.9 However, the construction of the UNCITRAL transparency rules 
differs from their predecessors in scope of applicability and mechanisms to ensure 
transparent arbitration proceedings.10  
A. Scope of the Transparency Rules 
First, as seen from the title, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration (the Rules), the Rules only apply to investor-state treaties, 
more commonly known as bilateral international treaties (BITs) and multi-lateral 
international treaties (MITs).11 Limiting the scope of the Rules to BITs and MITs eases 
the duty of the arbitrators when deciding the arbitrability of the Treaty. Nevertheless, 
other international treaties may specifically state within the language of the arbitral clause 
                                                                                                                                            
Schultz, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A 
Quantitative Empirical Study, EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147 (2014).  
8 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, G.A. Res. 
68/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Dec. 10, 2014) (UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency). 
9  See Judith Resnik, Feature, Arbitration, Transparency, and Privatization: Diffusing Disputes: 
the Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 
YALE L.J. 2804, 2896-99 (2015) (discussing California’s attempt to require the publication of 
consumer arbitration information and other states within the United States adoption of similar 
laws). 
10  Id. at 2898.  
11 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 1. “The UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (“Rules on Transparency”) shall apply to 
investor-State arbitration initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to a treaty 
providing for the protection of investments or investors (“treaty”) concluded on or after 1 April 
2014 unless the Parties to the treaty have agreed otherwise.” 
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that the UNCITRAL transparency rules will apply to any arbitration,12 thus 
demonstrating UNCITRAL’s intention to create universal rules of transparency.  
 To further promote transparent and fair arbitration, UNCITRAL requires that the 
Rules be applied to every BIT or MIT made on or after April 1, 201413 and encourages 
previously made treaties to apply the Rules through agreement.14 Additionally, the Rules 
grant great authority to the arbitrators in employing and enforcing the Rules, as well as in 
balancing the Rules with the public interest and the need for an efficient and fair 
adjudication.15 The only limitations restricting the scope of the Rules resides with the 
arbitrators, the original Treaty, and the State’s law.16 Otherwise, the Rules are to be used 
as a supplement to other arbitration rules,17 thereby working with additional rules to 
encourage the efficacy of arbitration. Such expansive application demonstrates 
UNCITRAL’s attempt to treat the Rules as a necessary and significant aspect of the 
arbitration process. 
 Although UNCITRAL implicated seemingly impenetrable transparency rules, the 
Rules are subject to exceptions,18 some of which may eventually lead to implementation 
problems. Under Article Seven of the Transparency Rules, the scope of the Rules is 
limited if there exists protected information that cannot be made public for confidentiality 
reasons19 or if such protected information would damage the integrity of the arbitration.20  
                                                
12 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 9. “These Rules are available for use 
in investor-State arbitrations initiated under rules other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or 
in ad hoc proceedings.”  
13 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 11, art. I, § 1. 
14 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 2. “In investor-State arbitrations 
initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to a treaty concluded before 1 April 
2014, these Rules shall apply only when: (a) The parties to an arbitration (the “disputing parties”) 
agree to their application in respect of that arbitration; or (b) The Parties to the treaty or, in the 
case of a multi- lateral treaty, the State of the claimant and the respondent State, have agreed after 
1 April 2014 to their application.” 
 
15 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8,  art. I, § 4. “Where the Rules on 
Transparency provide for the arbitral tribunal to exercise discretion, the arbitral tribunal in 
exercising such discretion shall take into account: (a) The public interest in transparency in treaty-
based investor-State arbitration and in the particular arbitral proceedings; and (b) The disputing 
parties’ interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute.”  
16 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, §§ 7-9. 
17 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. I, § 7. “Where the Rules on 
Transparency apply, they shall supplement any applicable arbitration rules. Where there is a 
conflict between the Rules on Transparency and the applicable arbitration rules, the Rules on 
Transparency shall prevail. Notwithstanding any provision in these Rules, where there is a conflict 
between the Rules on Transparency and the treaty, the provisions of the treaty shall prevail.” 
18 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VII. 
19 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VII, § 1. In order to be deemed 
confidentially protected, the information must include secret business dealings or strategies § 2(a), 
is protected contractually § 2(b) or by law § 2(c), would inhibit law enforcement if disclosed to the 
public § 2(d), or would put the State’s securities at risk § 5. 
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Facially, these exceptions seem carefully thought out; however, for example, 
consider the exception of contractually protected confidential information.21 Because of 
the freedom to contract,22 parties can agree by treaty to avoid the Rules altogether if such 
information is deemed confidential by each party. Opponents to this claim may say that 
even such contractual language has its limitations as established by Article Seven’s 
arbitrator review of the alleged protected information.23 Nevertheless, even though 
arbitrators may consult with the parties in determining the importance of not 
publicizing,24 the Rules in no way state how the arbitrators are to consider contractual 
confidentiality in light of the Rules. Article One specifically states that the Rules are not 
to take the place of or trump the original Treaty,25 which when supplemented with Article 
Seven, seems to contradict the overarching goal of the Rules. 
B. Mechanisms of Transparency 
 Aside from the questionable exceptions to the Rules, UNCITRAL included three 
categories of mechanisms to promote arbitration transparency: the publication of the 
arbitration information and documents,26 third person and third party submissions,27 and 
public hearings.28 Prior to the Rules, UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings were known for 
closed hearings, secret awards, and restricted submissions by third parties.29 Although 
                                                                                                                                            
20 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VII, §§ 6, 7. Submitted items that may 
“jeopardize” the fairness and efficiency of the arbitration cannot be made available to the public. 
Jeopardizing the integrity of the proceedings include interfering with the collection of evidence, 
intimidating witnesses, lawyers, or the tribunal, and other “exceptional circumstances.” 
21 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 19, art. VII, § 2(b).  
22 See generally Thomas Carbonneau, Article, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral 
Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 246 (2005) (discussing how the freedom of contract can 
diminish states’ ability to pass effective legislation and regulations). 
23 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency , supra note 8, art. VII, § 3. “The arbitral tribunal, after 
consultation with the disputing parties, shall make arrangements to prevent any confidential or 
protected information from being made available to the public, including by putting in place, as 
appropriate: (a) Time limits in which a disputing party, non-disputing Party to the treaty or third 
person shall give notice that it seeks protection for such information in documents; (b) Procedures 
for the prompt designation and redaction of the particular confidential or protected information in 
such documents; and (c) Procedures for holding hearings in private to the extent required by 
article 6, paragraph 2. Any determination as to whether information is confidential or protected 
shall be made by the arbitral tribunal after consultation with the disputing parties.” 
24 Id. 
25 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 17, art. I, § 7.  
26 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. II, III. 
27 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, V. 
28 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI.  
29 See Samuel Levander, Note, Resolving “Dynamic Interpretation”: an Empirical Analysis of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 506, 517 (2014). 
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traditional, such private arbitrations have created a skeptical and untrusting international 
public.30 Thus, each UNCITRAL Rule mechanism attempts to foster a reliable and 
public-friendly environment that is accessible and informative.  
  1. Publications 
 Articles Two and Three of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor-State Arbitration outline the types of information to be published, when 
the information is to be published, and who is responsible for making the documents 
available. Article Two specifically applies to information to be available at the onset of 
the arbitral proceedings, while Article Three focuses on the publication of all documents 
during the arbitration.31 
 Under Article Two, the repository32 must publicize the names of the parties in 
dispute, the economic industry affected, and the treaty or international contract upon 
which the claim is based. This information is to be made available at the beginning of 
arbitration,33 similar to when a complaint and answer are filed in court proceedings. After 
arbitration has commenced, Article Three lists the various documents that must be 
published, unless exempted by Article Seven.34 Other than those particular documents 
listed in Section One, the arbitral tribunal has the authority to determine what documents 
should be made available to the public.35 Furthermore, the tribunal is also allowed to 
request the publications of expert and witness testimony and consult with the disputing 
parties to determine what exhibits are to be published.36 Once the arbitral tribunal has 
established what documents to publish, it must report to the repository those documents 
                                                
30 See Robin Emmott, EU Makes Pitch for Arbitration Court to Unblock U.S. Trade Talks, 
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2015, 9:39 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/16/eu-usa-
trade-idUSL5N11M2BB20150916.   
31 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. II, III. 
32 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VIII (stating that the repository is to 
be the Secretary-General of the United Nations or any other institution named by UNCITRAL). 
33 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. II. 
34 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 1. “[T]he following documents 
shall be made available to the public: the notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of 
arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of defence and any further written statements or 
written sub- missions by any disputing party; a table listing all exhibits to the aforesaid documents 
and to expert reports and witness statements, if such table has been prepared for the proceedings, 
but not the exhibits themselves; any written submissions by the non-disputing Party (or Parties) to 
the treaty and by third persons, transcripts of hearings, where available; and orders, decisions and 
awards of the arbitral tribunal.” 
35 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 3 (the arbitrators have the 
discretion to meet with the disputing parties in order to decide what other materials should be 
published, if any). 
36 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 2 (the arbitrators are only 
limited by Article Seven exemptions).  
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so the repository can publish the information in a “timely manner.”37 
 Both Article Two and Article Three attempt to limit the disputing parties’ power 
in deciding what information to share with the public. Investors may argue that such 
publications can endanger sensitive business data, strategies, and trade secrets,38 but the 
Rules have built in safety nets to ensure protected information stays protected. First, by 
consultation with the arbitral tribunal, parties can make a case for why certain 
information should not be published or at least needs to be redacted.39 Second, Article 
Seven exceptions prohibit arbitrators from publishing confidential business and securities 
information. Therefore, UNCITRAL has taken the investors’ arguments seriously and 
attempted to shield businesses from the possible harmful effects of public accessibility, 
while promoting arbitration as a serious alternative dispute resolution that is consistent, 
legitimate, and flexible to the public’s needs.40 
  2. Submissions 
 Articles Four and Five govern submissions made by a third person and by a non-
disputing third party to the Treaty, respectively.41 The main difference between Articles 
Four and Five is the party’s association to the Treaty. A third person who is not a party to 
the Treaty in any way is allowed to submit a matter within the scope of the dispute under 
Article Four;42 a third party who is subject to the Treaty but is not a part of the dispute is 
allowed to submit a matter within the scope of the dispute under Article Five.43 
 In general, Articles Four and Five allow submissions at the discretion of the 
arbitral tribunal, so long as the submissions do not “disrupt” or “unfairly prejudice” the 
proceedings or any of the disputing parties.44 Moreover, although the arbitral tribunal has 
discretion to allow the submissions, the disputing parties must be given “reasonable 
                                                
37 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 4 (absent a direct definition of 
“timely manner,” the repository would be most likely held to some standard of reasonability).  
38 Levander, supra note 29. 
39 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. III, § 4 (redactions of any published 
information must be made according to Article Seven). 
40 Levander, supra note 29, at 511. 
41 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, V.  
42 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, § 1. “After consultation with the 
disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal may allow a person that is not a disputing party, and not a 
non-disputing Party to the treaty (‘third person(s)’), to file a written submission with the arbitral 
tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute.” 
 
43 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. V, § 1. “The arbitral tribunal shall, 
subject to paragraph 4, allow, or, after consultation with the disputing parties, may invite, 
submissions on issues of treaty interpretation from a non- disputing Party to the treaty.” 
44 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, § 5. See also UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency, supra note 8, art. V, § 4.   
  100 
opportunity” to comment on any of the submissions.45  
 Allowing third party submissions hugely encourages transparency within 
arbitration. Part of the problem with traditional arbitration stems from the lack of 
adequate data, which then leads to an insufficient amount of information that arbitrators 
have as a basis for their award.46  Submissions add to the available information arbitrators 
can use to come to a conclusion and grant other parties a chance to argue why they are 
affected by this dispute. Not only does the public and other Treaty parties receive an 
opportunity to bring their concerns to light, but the third party submissions can also 
highlight the benefits that a disputing party brings to the State, the global economy, the 
industry, or the public welfare. Such information is invaluable because even though the 
dispute may seemingly affect only a few parties, the consequences of the arbitral outcome 
could be on a much larger scale; thus, the submissions bring forth ideas and information 
that would otherwise go unnoticed. 
  3. Public Hearings 
 Article Six of UNCITRAL’s Rules provides the third mechanism for transparent 
arbitration. Under Article Six, all evidentiary hearings and all oral arguments are to be 
publicly held.47 Additionally, the burden is upon the tribunal to arrange the necessary 
logistics to make the arbitration proceedings public, limited by the feasibility of such 
arrangements.48 Lastly, Article Six, like Article Seven, protects information that is either 
confidential or a threat to the integrity of the arbitration, allowing the arbitral tribunal to 
hold partially private hearings.49 Therefore, Article Six places a duty upon the arbitral 
tribunal to guarantee that the public has access to the majority of the arbitration while 
maintaining the security of traditional arbitration.50  
                                                
45 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. IV, § 6. See also UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency, supra note 8, art. V, § 5.  
46 See generally TOM TIETENBERG & LYNNE LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL & NATURAL RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS 78, 549 (Sally Yagan, et al. eds., 9th ed. 2012). Appropriately valuing the 
environment takes into account the damages to it as well as the benefits from it. Because these 
values are difficult to calculate, more data is essential to placing an actual price tag on the 
environment. Additionally, with a lack of transparency in traditional arbitration, the burden of 
proof is lower for the plaintiff and thus, information and data are often incomplete and inadequate. 
47 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI, § 1. “Subject to article 6, 
paragraphs 2 and 3, hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument (“hearings”) 
shall be public.” 
48See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI, § 3.  The arbitral tribunal has only 
a duty to meet with the disputing parties to determine the logistics needed, if any, and whether 
such logistics would be an impediment to the arbitration. 
49 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI, § 2. “Where there is a need to 
protect confidential information or the integrity of the arbitral process pursuant to article 7, the 
arbitral tribunal shall make arrangements to hold in private that part of the hearing requiring such 
protection.” 
50 See generally UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VI, VII. Questionably, this 
limited duty usurps the general finality of the arbitral award. If a party appeals the award based on 
lack of public access (an excess of arbitrator authority), what dictates whether the arbitrator failed 
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 Giving the public the opportunity to observe the arbitral proceedings seems 
harmless. However, although the Rules’ critics can argue that publications and 
submissions toe the line towards court adjudication, public hearings certainly cross the 
fading barrier between arbitration and the common law court. Part of the appeal of 
arbitration is its privacy and secretiveness.51 Once those distinguishing characteristics 
become evanescent, why would parties even bother to choose arbitration. It can be 
contended that arbitration remains beneficial to commercial transactions even with added 
public hearings,52 but that is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, parties by and 
large will continue to arbitrate within the international world of commercial transaction 
so long as some aspect of privacy and secrecy remain. 
III. THE TRANSPARENCY RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
 Traditionally, investor-state arbitration focused on commercial disputes arising 
from a Treaty but not including derivative issues, such as environmental problems.53 
With the improvement of technology and the expansion of science, commercial 
contractual disputes have evolved to include environmental concerns. Unfortunately, the 
arbitration setting, prior to the adoption of the transparency rules, was not set up to 
resolve environmental claims.54 Lacking the arbitral setting results in arbitral tribunals 
either ignoring environmental disputes or inadequately adjudicating environmental 
issues.55  By enacting transparency rules, UNCITRAL prescribes value to the 
environmental disputes and to the public voice. 
                                                                                                                                            
to allow the public access? In other words, will the Court still resolve award disputes in favor of 
the arbitrator or do the Rules tip the scale in favor of the public? The entirety of the Rules revolves 
around the promotion of public awareness and public access, but if the Court continues to favor 
the arbitrator, the Rules fail. 
51See generally Robert D. Argen, Note, Ending Blind Spot Justice: Broadening the Transparency 
Trend in International Arbitration, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 207, 213-221 (2014) (discussing the 
difference between privacy – restriction of public access, and confidentiality – restriction of 
disclosing information within the proceedings). 
52 Samuel Levander, Note, Resolving “Dynamic Interpretation”: an Empirical Analysis of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 506, 511 (2014) (finding that 
transparency decreases uncertainty in arbitral proceedings while increasing its consistency, 
democracy, and legitimacy). 
53 Christina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Symposium, Going Green: Managing the 
Environment Through International Investment Arbitration, 30 AM. U. INT’L REV. 383, 388-89 
(2015) (discussing that even if environmental disputes are included in the arbitral clause, language 
and custom barriers still pose problems to enforcing the submitted disputes). 
54 See Julianne J. Marley, Note, The Environmental Endangerment Finding in International 
Investment Disputes, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1003, 1013-14 (2014) (stating that critics of 
traditional arbitration of environmental disputes do not think there are enough procedural 
safeguards to protect the public interest).  
55 Id. at 1011-13 (examining how the inconsistencies of arbitrators in interpreting and applying 
environmental regulations and public interest rights lead to a race to the bottom and have an 
overall chilling effect on environmental laws). 
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 With the adoption of the Rules, environmental concerns are now arbitrable. Under 
Article One of UNCITRAL’s transparency rules, any BIT or MIT dispute triggering 
UNCITRAL arbitration must apply the transparency rules.56 Thus, any submission of any 
arbitrable issue falls within the scope of the Rules, including questions about the 
environment. Furthermore, Article One specifically grants authority to the arbitral 
tribunal to consider both the disputing parties’ desire for “fair and efficient” adjudication 
and the public’s interest in the matters.57 Because arbitrators now have the power to 
weigh the public opinion, environmental concerns will stand a better chance of being 
adjudicated fully, properly, and resourcefully.58 
 More important than the scope of the Rules’ application is the manner in which 
arbitration will encourage the adjudication of environmental issues. Environmental issues 
span a vast range of topics, including natural resources, land use, ocean uses and 
pollution, energy, air and water pollution, and climate change.59 Because of the various 
topics incorporated in environmental disputes, arbitrators need to have a strategy to fully 
collect scientific information and analyze the most current research and data available. 
Prior to transparency rules, arbitrators had no incentive to develop a unitary procedure to 
rule on environmental disputes, leading to numerous interpretations of treaties and 
regulations, conflicting resolutions, and negative effects on developing states.60 With 
UNCITRAL’s new Rules on Transparency, arbitrators now have a duty to enforce open 
proceedings, increasing the probability of scientific findings being applied more 
uniformly and decreasing the likelihood of surprising results. Through the three 
transparency mechanisms, environmental disputes will become more consistent, raise 
awareness, and reaffirm arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution option. 
First, UNCITRAL’s publications will encourage consistency among 
environmental arbitrations,61 which in turn will further predictability and efficiency. 
Without transparency, the arbitral tribunal has a difficult time uniformly applying 
precedent. Specifically, publishing arbitration documents will allow arbitrators to use 
                                                
56 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 11, art. I, § 1. 
57 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 15, art. I, § 4(b). 
58 Compare Beharry, et. al., supra note 53, at 429 (discussing the need to balance public interests 
of the State with the negative impacts of regulation on international investors), and Marley, supra 
note 54, at 1022, 1024, 1031 (analyzing various arbitration procedures for ensuring the proper 
adjudication of environmental disputes – expert witnesses, deference to State findings, and third 
party amici), with The Honorable Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, Article, What’s in a 
Meme? The Truth About Investor-State Arbitration: Why it Need Not, and Must Not, Be 
Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 727-29 (2014) (arguing that investment 
tribunals do not “strike down” the environmental regulations of States). The argument is not that 
arbitral tribunals “strike down” environmental regulations but that environmental regulations take 
a backseat to the investor’s needs and interests without transparency and public interest safeguards 
to adequately adjudicate environmental disputes. 
59 Environmental Issues and Solutions to Current Environment Problems, NATURAL RESOURCES 
DEFENSE COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/issues/ (last visited May 17, 2016). 
60 Marley, supra note 54, at 1017. 
61 See generally Levander, supra note 52. 
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previous environmental arbitration cases to defend their award, while also allowing the 
arbitrators to build upon the science and knowledge of past decisions. Moreover, the 
publication mechanism will create a consistent system in which the disputing parties can 
prepare to the best of their abilities by looking at precedent arbitrations and effectively 
utilizing their resources. Therefore, consistency in arbitration will transitively promote 
predictability and efficiency. The more consistent the system becomes, the more 
predictable the arbitration setting becomes, leading to a better allocation of arbitral 
resources62 and less time being wasted on matters that were previously and properly 
adjudicated.  
Aside from the advancement of consistency, publications will generate awareness 
for environmental issues that would otherwise tend to be ignored or adjudicated 
improperly.63 By publishing arbitral materials, UNCITRAL acknowledges that investor-
state disputes about commercial enterprises are no longer the only important matters to be 
arbitrated. Environmental concerns that would have remained hidden, buried, or 
inadequately handled can now surface, bringing forward new questions about how 
investor-state relations manage public interest concerns. 
 Second, the Rules’ submission mechanism will also benefit environmental 
arbitration by generating a more informative setting. As mentioned above, environmental 
issues are numerous, diverse, and complex.64 By permitting third persons and third 
parties to submit documents and information about the environmental dispute in question, 
the arbitrators will have more access to data, research, and information about externalities 
that would otherwise be difficult to obtain and understand. With additional information, 
the arbitrators can render more thorough and decisive awards, thus reestablishing the 
finality and overall autonomy of arbitration as an alternative form of adjudication.65 
Although finality of an arbitral award may not always favor the public interest side of the 
dispute, the submission mechanism within UNCITRAL’s transparency rules will 
equilibrate the arbitration setting between corporate investors and developing states by 
providing more opportunities to acquire scientific data and present outside opinions.66  
                                                
62 See Mihaela Papa, Emerging Powers in International Dispute Settlement: From Legal Capacity 
Building to a Level Playing Field?, J. INT. DISP. SETTLEMENT 4(1): 83-109 (2013) (discussing how 
the allocation of resources during arbitration depends on the economic state of the country and the 
assistance that country receives from more developed nations). 
63 See generally TOM TIETENBERG & LYNNE LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL & NATURAL RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS 78, 550 (Sally Yagan, et al. eds., 9th ed. 2012) (emphasizing the importance of 
freedom of information in today’s society). 
64 NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, Supra note 59. 
65 See generally Thomas Carbonneau, Article, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral 
Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 213-14, 219 (2005) (discussing how judicial review of 
the award interferes with arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution). 
66 See Beharry, et. al., supra note 53, at 411-18 (suggesting that third party participation creates a 
system to better evaluate scientific information) and Marley, supra note 54, at 1022, 1031 
(discussing that expert witnesses and third party amici could help alleviate environmental dispute 
inconsistencies in arbitration). 
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 Lastly, the public hearings mechanism provided in UNCITRAL’s transparency 
rules is not a device by which the disputing parties can acquire information or arbitrators 
can substantiate their awards. Nevertheless, public hearings will benefit arbitration by 
demonstrating the reliability of arbitration to the public.67 Part of the debate encircling the 
arbitration of environmental disputes is the lack of societal support. Because of the 
questionable ethics and practices that investors have exercised in past investor-state 
relationships,68 the general public hesitates to embrace traditional international arbitration 
that favors secrecy and money over environmental protection and public rights. With 
public hearings, arbitration has a chance to make amends with the international 
community, reestablishing itself as a trustworthy, reliable, and efficient adjudication 
procedure that can take on environmental issues. 
 Nonetheless, due to the Rules’ built in contract exception in which parties can 
agree to keep various information private,69 environmental disputes can still remain 
partially or completely concealed. Arbitrators will have to take great care in fulfilling 
their new public interest duties when granting this exception so as to ensure that 
environmental disputes do not get pushed to the bottom of the barrel and remain in the 
stalemate of traditional arbitration. The freedom to contract, although powerful, will 
hopefully be limited by legitimate and good faith conflict resolution interests of all 
parties and the influence of the interested public sector. 
 With the advancement of science and technology, more environmental concerns 
are likely to follow. Yet, this advancement also leads to better preventative measures and 
solutions. If applied appropriately, UNCITRAL’s transparency rules recognize and grant 
opportunities for both stages of environmental concerns, providing a proper and efficient 
forum for arguing new environmental disputes and solving such disputes with the best 
science and technology available.  
IV. THE TRANSPARENCY RULES AND ECONOMIC FAIRNESS  
 There is little doubt that foreign investment in developing countries provides a 
foundation for economic growth.70 Nevertheless, investing in developing countries often 
comes at the cost of the environment.71 Generally, investors focus on the positive 
                                                
67 See Robin Emmott, EU Makes Pitch for Arbitration Court to Unblock U.S. Trade Talks, 
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2015, 9:39 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/16/eu-usa-
trade-idUSL5N11M2BB20150916.  
68 See Beharry, et. al., supra note 53, at 398-402 (referencing the arbitral decisions of S.D. Myers 
Inc. v. Canada, Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, and Chemtura 
Corp. v. Canada). 
69 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 19, art. VII, § 2(b). 
70 See generally The Honorable Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, Article, What’s in a 
Meme? The Truth About Investor-State Arbitration: Why it Need Not, and Must Not, Be 
Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (2014).  
71 See generally TIETENBERG, ET. AL., supra note 63, at 78 (discussing that the accurate value of 
foreign investment is difficult to calculate but must include the offset of negative externalities on 
the environment). 
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economic benefits they receive from and bring to developing nations, completely 
ignoring the negative externalities that arise from their investments.72 When disputes do 
surface about the negative externalities, the secrecy and nontransparency of traditional 
arbitration could allow investor corporations to be compensated for not following 
environmental regulations.73 Such compensation acts as an award for the investors, 
thereby defeating the purpose of environmental regulations and creating a race to the 
bottom.74 UNCITRAL’s transparency rules will not only invite the adjudication of 
environmental disputes, but the Rules will also level the economic playing field between 
financially secure investors and developing states by creating a more predictable forum in 
which investors and states have equal access and can be held accountable by the public 
for unfair practices. 
 First, under the Rules’ publications mechanism, arbitration becomes more 
predictable.75 Previously published arbitral materials can be used by all disputing parties 
to strategically and economically allocate their resources. For instance, if the precedent 
establishes a pattern on one type of environmental regulation or concern, parties can 
focus their energy, time, and money on proving the precedent applies, or decide that their 
resources would be better spent on a different argument. By having a chance to strategize 
and prepare, transparent arbitration enables disputing parties to pick and choose how they 
want to present the best argument, no longer expending their resources on guessing how 
the arbitrators will rule.76 Publications grant equal access to previous arbitration 
materials, present parties with choices, and give developing nations an opportunity to 
utilize their limited resources efficiently. 
 Additionally, submissions and public hearings work in tandem to create an 
arbitration setting that encourages fair economic practices. Both submissions and public 
hearings generate a system in which the symbiotic relationships between investors and 
                                                
72 Compare The Honorable Charles N. Brower, supra note 70, at 702-03 (discussing how BITs 
promote economic growth in developing nations by increasing incoming investments), with 
TIETENBERG, ET. AL., supra note 63, at 78-9, 593 (explaining that true valuation must include the 
use value of the environment, the option value of the environment, and the nonuse value of the 
environment, not just the incoming investments, which can be offset by negative externalities). 
73 See TIETENBERG, ET. AL., supra note 63, at 549-50 and Thomas Schultz, Investment Arbitration: 
Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 25(4): 1147 (2014) (comparing international arbitration to colonialism because 
arbitration tends to favor stronger, more developed countries). 
74 See TIETENBERG, ET. AL., supra note 63, at 549-50 and see Marley, supra note 54, at 1013.   
75 See Leon E. Trakman, Article, The ICSID Under Seige, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 616 (2012) 
(explaining that the lack of predictability in arbitration affects developing states the most because 
of their lack of resources to pay the fees, collect research and data, and prepare defenses). 
76 See generally Julianne J. Marley, Note, The Environmental Endangerment Finding in 
International Investment Disputes, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. & POL. 1003, 1017 (2014) (discussing that 
a lack of transparency in arbitral proceedings leads to various interpretations of conflicts, treaties, 
and laws); see also Mihaela Papa, Emerging Powers in International Dispute Settlement: From 
Legal Capacity Building to a Level Playing Field?, J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 4(1): 83-109 
(2013) (analyzing how the success of developing nations often depends upon their understanding 
of the underlying treaties and arbitral procedures). 
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states are rewarded but unfair practices and improper ethics are penalized.77 Primarily, 
submissions by third persons and third parties encourage disputing parties to account for 
both benefits and costs of transactions78 while the transparency of the submissions, in 
addition to the public hearings, utilizes freedom of information79 to pressure the parties 
and the arbitrators into ensuring the fairness of the agreement and the resolution.  
Freedom of information is a key mantra for living in today’s fast paced and ever-
changing society.80 Traditional arbitration fails to embrace the modernity of the 
availability of information, and now arbitration tribunals are rapidly attempting to adapt 
arbitration to the current needs of the millennial generation.81 Although traditional 
arbitration’s privacy may continue to work for private commercial transactions, with the 
growth of interlocking worldwide connections among businesses, consumers, and the 
general public, such privacy acts as a red flag to individuals who value knowledge and 
awareness. This value is the pressure that encourages investor-state arbitration to balance 
economic anomalies that arise due to the traditional notion of commercial dispute 
resolution. Moreover, freedom of information activates a type of checks and balances by 
encouraging the public to take part in the disputes, both through submissions and public 
hearings. Such mechanisms allow public scrutiny, which elevates the burden of proof for 
                                                
77 TIETENBERG, ET. AL., supra note 63, at 597-8 (Sally Yagan, et al. eds., 9th ed. 2012) (stating that 
adjudication proceedings need to ensure that all involved parties are held accountable for their 
actions to promote financial responsibility and environmental value). 
 
78 Id. at 78-79. Theoretically, third person and third party submissions will not only add to the 
issue but also bring forth new information and concerns that would not have been brought forth 
because the issue was too difficult to find, a party did not want it to be arbitrated, or costs 
prohibited it from being brought to the tribunal at that time. With submissions, outside parties can 
assert authority in making sure that specific issues are discussed and that, regardless of costs, 
concerns that should be adjudicated are properly imposed on the arbitrators. 
79 TIETENBERG, ET. AL., supra note 63,  at 549-50. 
80 See Caroline H. Little, Why Strengthening the Freedom of Information Act is So Important, 
NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (April 2015), http://www.naa.org/News-and-Media/CEO-
Update/2015-April.aspx. “The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1966. It remains 
critical for creating and preserving an open and accountable government. However, it must be 
updated to keep up with changing technology and a persistent mindset within federal agencies that 
information belongs to the government not the general public.” 
81 See generally Mark Hendricks, Marketing to Millennials: You’d Better Learn to Keep Up, 
ALLBUSINESS, https://www.allbusiness.com/marketing-to-millennials-youd-better-learn-to-keep-
up-16697426-1.html (last visted June 9, 2016) (discussing the impacts of technology and easily 
accessible information on younger generations and their marketability). See also Amy Mitchell, 
Jeffrey Gottfried & Katerina Eva Matsa, How Millennials, Gen Xers and Boomers Get Political 
News, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 1, 2015), http://www.journalism.org/2015/06/01/millennials-
political-news/ (analyzing the various interests and mechanisms in which Millennials choose to 
acquire political information in comparison to previous generations). 
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the investor within the arbitral setting.82 With an elevated burden of proof, financially 
secure parties cannot easily overbear and outmaneuver financially weaker parties. 
Although freedom of information certainly pushes investor-state arbitration 
towards a more open and public forum where an economic equilibrium becomes a 
possibility, what happens when a party raises the affirmative defense and arbitral cliché 
of freedom to contract? As explained above in Part II, the UNCITRAL transparency rules 
allow exceptions to publishing documents.83 In order to ensure that the Rules promote 
economic fairness, arbitrators will have a renewed duty to question and analyze BITs and 
MITs and to balance the investors’ interests in financial security with the States’ interests 
in achieving economic goals through environmentally conscious practices. No longer will 
arbitrators be able to award solely on the basis of the Treaties’ words, which often favor 
the investor,84 with freedom of contract as their rationale. Freedom of information will 
allow the public to take a stance for the weaker party and bring forth a new wave of 
influential interest in economic practices and investment fairness. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The El Salvador and Pacific Rim conflict has been an ongoing international 
dilemma for the past six years.85 Generally, arbitration is desired for handling 
international commercial disputes because it is less costly than court proceedings, private 
and formatted for industrial and commercial relationships, and much more efficient than 
typical court adjudication.86 Six years is not efficient and creates more costs as the parties 
draw out the proceedings, so is traditional arbitration suitable for every international 
dispute? The answer, of course, is no. But although this seems obvious, reforming 
traditional arbitration that is specifically shaped to commercial transactions and not only 
to investor-state transactions remains difficult and controversial. 
 UNCITRAL’s Rules on Transparency attempt to push arbitration towards a more 
transparent, open, and accessible adjudicatory pathway. Whether these Rules will 
actually balance the inequality within the arbitral system will depend on how well they 
are applied and how consistently they are applied. Furthermore, even though UNCITRAL 
                                                
82 See TIETENBERG, ET. AL., supra note 63, at 550 (suggesting that a raised burden of proof, such as 
a showing of discrimination, would further increase the availability of documentation, 
information, and data to all parties and arbitrators). 
83 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 8, art. VII, § 2(b).  
84 See generally Christina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Symposium, Going Green: 
Managing the Environment Through International Investment Arbitration, 30 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 383, 388-89 (2015) (discussing how complex contractual language and different customs act 
as barriers towards effective investor-state arbitration). 
85 See Ciara Nugent, El Salvador vs Pacific Rim: The Price of Saying ‘No’ to a Gold Mine, THE 
ARGENTINA INDEPENDENT, (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/analysis/el-salvador-vs-pacific-rim-the-price-
of-saying-no-to-a-gold-mine/.  
86 See generally Thomas Carbonneau, Article, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral 
Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213 (2005).  
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enacted the Rules, other international arbitration tribunals have yet to follow suit. Thus, 
those parties that wish to avoid transparent proceedings only have to contractually agree 
to use another arbitral forum. Nevertheless, UNCITRAL’s Rules underscore the 
international community’s recognition of the need for evolving adjudication. Stagnant 
processes and systems never survive changing times and arbitration will not be the 
exception. This is particularly true with the advancement of technology and science. 
Currently, environmental disputes are rarely arbitrated,87 raising concerns about 
arbitration’s inability to adjudicate public interest issues. With new and advancing 
science and technology, however, environmental issues will need a stage for resolution. 
Arbitration could very well be that stage so long as the traditional notion of arbitration 
does not forcefully impose itself into environmental matters. 
 Unlike commercial transactions that have historically remained contractually 
based upon typically rigid and unchanging rules, the environment is a complex system 
that is constantly varying and being manipulated. An adjudicatory system that does not 
appreciate and cannot bend to certain needs of specific issues will not last as a prominent 
alternative in the international society. UNCITRAL’s transparency rules are the first step 
towards modernizing and shaping arbitration into an adjudicatory method that welcomes 
environmental disputes and public interest. By creating a set of rules that encourages 
arbitrators and parties to take full advantage of past arbitral decisions, UNCITRAL 
recognizes that science builds upon itself and economic resources are not equally 
distributed. As more environmental disputes arise from investor-state relations, 
transparent proceedings will become more valuable in addressing public concerns while 
maintaining efficiency. The Rules help demonstrate arbitration’s capacity to take on 
environmental issues and combat unfair economic practices, two fields that often go 
hand-in-hand.88 Through three transparency mechanisms – publications, submissions, and 
public hearings – arbitration now promotes environmental conflict resolution, efficient 
allocation of resources, and freedom of information. 
 Although the El Salvador and Pacific Rim dispute is governed under the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),89 the dispute 
beautifully portrays the limitations of traditional arbitration, both economically and 
environmentally. The outcome of this specific set of arbitral proceedings will determine 
the significance of State sovereignty, the role of the public, and the amount of concern for 
the environment on an international level. Arbitration has an opportunity to embrace 
modernizing. To remain a legitimate alternative dispute resolution system, arbitration, 
                                                
87 See Beharry, et. al., supra note 84, at 388-89 (2015). 
88 See Marley, supra note 76, at 1007 (explaining that investor-state arbitration allows investors to 
challenge States’ tax regulations, environmental regulations, and administrative regulations); see 
also TIETENBERG , supra note 63, at 593-94 (stating that sustainable development must account for 
both economic growth and negative environmental externalities). 
89 See Nugent, supra note 85; Lauren Carasik, Undermined – The Case Against International 
Arbitration Tribunals, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2014-10-01/undermined; see also Amy Westervelt, 
Lawsuit Against El Salvador Mining Ban Highlights Free Trade Pitfalls, THE GUARDIAN 
SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS (May 27, 2015, 13:16 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2015/may/27/pacific-rim-lawsuit-el-salvador-mine-gold-free-trade. 
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and those who play within its realm, must welcome transparency with gumption and 
vigor.
